The Cold War and the Crises of Political Transition and Sustainable Democracy in Africa: The Failed Elections in Nigeria, Algeria and Angola

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ABSTRACT

The dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 marked the end of the cold war where political struggles mirrored east-west ideological divide between capitalism and communism and ushering in the era of “new world order” that marked political shift in Africa from authoritarianism to multiparty democracy. However, most political transitions or handovers of power in Africa, as evidenced in the failed elections in Algeria, Angola and Nigeria were short-lived due to factors such as lack of political reconciliation, conflict over the imposition of religious ideology such as the “sharia”, regional divides and interethnic rivalries that eventually led to military interventions (coup de ‘tut). These failures call for the need for reform in African politics that would restore and sustain political accountability, multiparty democracy, perception of politics as a win-win endeavor, demilitarize politics, empower women and effectively manage ethnic diversity. The author argues that realization of these political goals would in the final analysis go a long way in permanently restoring and sustaining democratic rule in Africa. This paper aims to give account of these failed elections; identify the major reasons why they failed and recommend possible solutions necessary for sustainable democratic rule and governance in Africa.

Keywords: Cold War, New World Order, Autocracy, Guided Democracy, Bipolar World, Islam, Sharia, Hidjab, Elites, Brazzaville Protocol, Pius Okigbo Commission, UNITA, MPLA, FLN, Ennahda (Renaissance), Anarchy, Biafra, Koran, Gulf War, Organization of Islamic Conference, MAMSER, UNAVEM, Terrorism, Colonialism, Single Party Rule, Sustainable Democracy.

INTRODUCTION

The dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991 marked the end of the cold war. As such, regional conflicts in Africa and beyond fueled by the superpower relations in the bipolar world and characteristic of east-west ideological struggle began to abate. Africa, since then, began to experience a tide of democratic changes sweeping the continent. Henceforth, a New World Order marked by permanent and steady transitions of political power from autocracy to multiparty democracy began to emerge. It is well-established fact that political transitions particularly in Africa often trigger violence, tension and anxiety and strains ethnic and religious relationships.

However, examples of successful transitions or handover of political power from dictatorships to multiparty democracy in Africa are not far-fetched. On May 18, 1992, Ghana reverted to popular democracy with the election of Jerry Rawlings of the Provisional National Defense Council (PNDC). Rawlings had ruled Ghana with iron hand since his overthrow of Hilla Limann’s democratically elected government in December 1981.

In October 1992, Cameroon held its first multiparty presidential election since its independence from France on January 1, 1960. The election was won by Paul Biya with 40% support of the electorate against his strongest opposition Ni John FruNdi of the Socialist Democratic front (SDF) who garnered 36% electoral support.

Kenya experimented with multiparty democracy on December 31, 1992. It was its first democratic election since 1966. Kenya gained political independence from Britain in 1963. In this election which was participated by about two-thirds of Kenya’s registered voters,
President Daniel arap Moi and his party, Kenya African National Union (KANU) emerged winners. February 21, 1993 saw the reelection of Abdou Diouf in Senegal with an overwhelming 58.40% of the ballots over his seven rivals, including Iba der thiam, Abdoulaye Bathily, Landing Savane, abdoulaye Wade, Mamadou Lo, Madior Diouf and Babacar Niang.

In spite of these stories of electoral successes across Africa, three elections in selected regions of the continent stand out. They are the elections in Algeria (North Africa), Nigeria (West Africa) and Angola (Southern Africa). They serve as testimony that the euphoria about the decade of the 1990s as the “decade of democracy” might be over. What is interesting about these states is that they share many common characteristics. First, they are African states. Also, the trios were under European colonial rule prior to independence. For example, Algeria was a French colony while Nigeria and Angola were colonized by Britain and Portugal respectively. Furthermore, the three countries’ experiments for transition to democracy proved abortive or futile.

This paper therefore, sets to:

- Give accounts of the failed elections in Angola, Nigeria and Algeria
- Determine or identify plausible reasons why they all proved unsuccessful
- Discuss the political implications of the derailed political transitions to multiparty democracy to the political stability of the respective countries -Nigeria, Algeria and Angola
- Suggest what should be done to mitigate the situation. That is, recommend possible solutions to the social and political problems caused by the undermined elections in the three African states – Identify ways through which democratic governance can be sustained in Africa

**ALGERIA**

Since Algeria’s independence from France in 1962, its government had changed hand to some liberal-minded leaders like Houari Bourmediene and Chadli Bendjedid. The pressure for substantive reforms were never felt until the October disturbances in 1988. As Mortimer, Robert A. (1990) observed, mounting public pressure forced President Chadli Bendje did to rewrite the constitution to permit political pluralism after 26 years of National Liberation Front’s (FLN) single-party rule.

As a result of the revolts, a new social force, Islam was unleashed when many Algerians turned to Islamic religious ideology for political salvation and as a practical foundation to the vision of modern Algeria. To preempt the rise of Islamic fundamentalism, a new charter was promulgated to uphold the principle of a united and independent Algeria; celebrate the contributions of Islam in Algeria and promote Islam as the true religion of social justice and equality.

The growing sentiment shown by Algerians in embracing Islam gave impetus to the formation of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) to participate in the December 1991 first multiparty elections. The party’s platform reflected Islam’s religious ideology of full restoration of Islamic Law, the Sharia. This, argued Hermida, Alfred (1992) would lead to such radical changes as cutting off hand for theft, stoning for adultery, a ban on alcohol, and the adoption of strict Islamic dress for women known as the “hidjab”.

All political indicators showed that the FIS threat to the election was not a bluff. In municipal elections held in June 1990, the FIS won 54% of the votes. Even in the December 26, 1991 elections, the FIS won 188 seats in parliament while its next runner-up the Socialist Forces Front carried 26 seats. The electoral successes and momentum of the FIS raised eyebrows about Algeria’s civilian and military elites who saw an Islamic revolutionary orthodoxy as a threat to the political stability of modern Algeria. Pressure to prevent the FIS from coming to power began to build especially since most of Algeria’s Muslims were part of the majority in the Sunni Islamic faith as opposed to Shiite minority that rules Iran. More frightening was the FIS slogan which equated democracy to blasphemy and called the Koran (word of God) a substitute to the constitution.

The fear that Islamic fundamentalism could threaten the political stability of Algeria was not without evidence. In Tunisia, Algeria’s neighbor to the North, the government of Habib Bourguiba had been battling its fundamentalist movement, Ennahdha (Renaissance) trying to establish itself as a political party. The Ennahdha which advocated establishing an Islamic Republic as a substitute to the authoritarian regime of
Bourguiba was severely repressed by the government throughout the 1980s.

In 1986, Nigeria experienced trouble when the issue of Sharia law was raised with Nigeria’s official membership in the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC). According to Onuaguluchi, Gilbert (1990), opposition to Nigeria’s perception as an Islamic State had mounted in its southern regions which are predominantly Christian enclaves. The south had argued that Nigeria is legally a secular state by virtue of a law passed by the Constituent Assembly.

In Sudan which enjoys had polarized regional governments, controversy arose over the attempts by the ruling north to impose Islam over the predominantly Christian south. The political situation, argued Heraclides, Alexis (1987), was eventually exacerbated when in 1983 the government of Gafar Nimeiri institutionalized the Sharia (Islamic law). This imposition of northern religious hegemony over the south gave rise to resistance movements like the Anya-Nya II and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) whose struggles for regional autonomy threatened to dismember Sudan.

With the above negative consequences of Islamic law to the national integration and stability in many African states, the Algerian Army was ready to strike. The temptation proved timely when demonstrations against electoral irregularities like rigging and voter intimidation practices were mounted against the FIS. Many political observers and analysts believed that the success of the FIS was due to protest vote by the Algerian electorate against the National Liberation Front (FLN) because of the latter’s inability to create jobs, control inflation, corruption, widespread poverty and other symptoms of social and institutional moral decadence.

In order to carry out the plan, the military forced Chadli Benjeid an accomodationist / Centrist out of office by resignation perhaps to give the impression that it was not a staged coup. This was reinforced by the appearance of the Algerian Prime Minister Ghozali to assure the Algerian people that he was in charge. Of course, this thinking faded when the Military appointed a 5-man Council headed by Mohamed Boudiaf. The Chairman of the Council, a hero in Algeria’s war of independence against colonial France was believed to have been selected in order to boost the legitimacy of the regime.

Systematic steps were taken by the military rulers to weaken the fundamentalist movement forever. Laws were passed to separate religion from politics. Many Imams who were sympathetic to the fundamentalist movements were arrested; and bans on mass religious gatherings around the capital Algiers were enforced. In some cases, religious clergy who were allowed to preach were also required to obtain government approval. In January 1992, the government banned organizations from contributing funds to charity as a way to weaken their base of sympathy, support, interaction and recruitment of the masses. The government had argued that it exclusively regarded that as a vital function of the state.

In February 1992. The Algerian Head of State Mohamed Boudiaf sealed the lid on the activities of Islamic fundamentalists when he imposed a year-long state of emergency on Algeria. Since the decision of the Algerian leader to cancel the second round of parliamentary elections which the FIS was poised to win in January 1992. The Islamic Fundamentalist groups intensified their campaigns to overthrow the ruling government through violent means. Thus, a climate of fear, terror and intimidation deepened as many Algerian journalists, academics and leading political figures were assassinated.

As the security situation worsened, the frustrated regime became even more repressive. Special anti-terrorist courts created under the “state of emergency powers in 1992 handed down hundreds of death sentences aimed at curbing terrorist activities, but with no avail. Once again, the option of a negotiated settlement between the ruling government and the competing factions appeared more attractive in resolving the Algerian crisis.

In his first address to the nation on February 7, 1994, the new President Lamine Zeroual who the army appointed expressed the commitment of his administration to negotiate with major Algerian parties, including representatives of the Islamic Salvation Front. President Zeroual’s promises perhaps then held the last hope for a negotiated settlement to the Algerian problem.

**ANGOLA**

Angola received its political independence from Portugal in 1975 following a grueling war of independence. After independence, a civil war ensued because of internal power struggle that
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developed among the three main liberation movements, namely the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) and the National Union for the Total independence of Angola (UNITA). Due to lack of external support, the FNLA headed by Holden Roberto unraveled and was absorbed by the MPLA which offered national amnesty to its supporters. The MPLA controlled the Angolan central government under the leadership of Augustina Neto; and at the death of Neto, he was succeeded by Eduardo dos Santos. The MPLA’s rival liberation movement, UNITA came under the leadership of Jonas Savimbi.

Because this era or period was at the heat of the cold war, the conflict took on east-West dimension. The MPLA was supported by the Soviet Union and Cuba which introduced thousands of troops on the ground. In contrast and with the repeal of the Clarke Amendment in 1976 which prohibited clandestine international military operation by the United States, the hurdle was cleared for America’s full-scale military and financial assistance to UNITA. According to data provide by Martin, Phillis M. (1989), the United States annual military assistance to UNITA between 1986 and 1988 was in the tune of 16 million dollars.

With Mikhail Gorbachev at the helm of power in the Soviet Union, East-West tensions diminished. His “new thinking” philosophy and doctrine, argued Hall, Richard (1990) tended to deemphasized ideology as the centerpiece of Soviet foreign policy or as central to the settlement of international disputes. On December 13, 1988 the pressure from the United States and the Soviet Union, the Brazzaville Protocol was signed in New York by Cuba, Angola and South Africa. The agreement was intended to demilitarize the region through South Africa’s military disengagement from Namibia; evoke the gradual withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola and clear the way for the UN supervised election in Namibia, which in the view of Baker, Pauline H. (1989), helped restore relative peace and stability in Angola and set the stage for a democratic election in that country.

The first Angolan democratic election since independence was scheduled for September 1992. To encourage the participation of all parties or factions, the United States Congress provided 30 million dollars to be spent in support of that move. An even-handed approach was applied because the fund was designated to benefit the two main parties to the dispute. Although all the parties seemed to agree to participate in the election, the issue of security was primary in the minds of election observers. On May 31, 1991, Jonas Savimbi and Angolan President Jose Eduardo Dos Santos signed a peace accord or agreement to integrate their armies before the election which would be monitored by international observers. Also, the agreement provided that all soldiers be required to surrender their weapons at internationally monitored assembly points throughout Angola.

The United Nations provided the funds for advisement, preparation, implementation and other technical expertise and logistics for monitoring the election. The Angolan government was responsible for administering it. To enhance its effectiveness, the UN Angola Verification and Election Monitoring Regime (UNAVEM) provided helicopters in order to reach the remote parts of Angola. It was estimated that UNAVEM sponsored up to 1,000 international monitors in the Angolan elections.

Although incidents of violence were reported during the election, reports indicated that it was a success. In a national population of about 12 million, 4.8 million were eligible to vote. Among the 18 parties that contested the elections, unofficial results indicated that UNITA won 33% (approximately a third) of the vote while the MPLA won 51% (about half). The remaining 6% vote went to the minority candidates among who were Holden Roberto and Daniel Chipenda. A breakdown of the electoral map showed that a great number of people of ethnic Ovimbundu areas voted for UNITA. In fact, the strength of UNITA’s vote or support matched the ratio of its ethnic representation in Angola’s general population. The Ovimbundu ethnic population who inhabited the arid parts of central and southern Angola where the activities of UNITA were strong overwhelmingly voted for UNITA. In contrast, the MPLA’s stronghold was among the Mbundu ethnic group which comprised about a quarter (25%) of the national population. Also, the MPLA gathered a lot of support from the urban and rural areas that were heavily mined by UNITA forces. Among this population, the MPLA was perceived as a protector party while UNITA was labelled a terrorist party.
But, the official results of the presidential general elections proved otherwise. In the official tally, which was released within two days by Savimbi in his headquarters in Huambo before the announcement by the National Electoral Council, Dos Santos won approximately half (49.57%) of all votes cast; Savimbi won 40.07%, while the other nine candidates and their parties shared the remaining 10.36%. What is clear here is that no candidate emerged a clear and outright majority winner. A clear winner would require more than 50% of the votes. Thus, under normal circumstances, a runoff election by the two top vote getters would be required to determine a clear winner.

However, Finkel, Vicki R. (1993) discovered that in the parliamentary race, the MPLA received a clear majority of 53.85 percent to form the new government, gaining 129 of the 220 parliamentary seats while the remaining 21 seats were divided among 10 third parties.

Having lost the September 29-30 elections of 1992, Savimbi refused to accept the outcome or result. He charged the government with massive fraud and withdrew UNITA commanders from their new posts in the unified Angolan Army. He officially threatened that if the results of the election were not annulled, and a runoff election held, he would resume his insurgency activities. But, under the prevailing state of confusion, chaos and violence, it was difficult to undertake another election within a short space of time. Perhaps, it was in the best interest of the winning party, the MPLA not to accept to hold a new election.

The MPLA was confronted with a challenge it could not meet. The government of Dos Santos immediately ruled out the possibility of a new balloting until UNITA disarmed its military supporters and gave up all territory its army occupied for national control. Furthermore, the MPLA charged UNITA of mounting a coup and arming the Angolan populace for an offensive to root out the armed supporters of UNITA from Luanda. This it did successfully rendering the chance of a new election impossible. Having been convinced that the election was free and fair, the international community recognized that UNITA constituted a lasting obstacle to peace in Angola. The diplomatic recognition of Angola by the Clinton Administration in the United States showed that the kind of behavior depicted by UNITA could not be tolerated anymore even though the Bush administration was an ally of Savimbi during the cold war. Although UNITA refused to accept the legitimacy of the elections, the international community tried to impose the popular mandate on UNITA without any preconditions.

The United Nations pursued this strategy in many ways. On September 26, 1992 the world body instituted a sanction on arms and fuel supplies against UNITA. This came after about a week delay to gamble on a possible change of heart by UNITA in terms of accepting the results of the September 1992 elections and the cessation of hostilities against the Angolan national government. The delay to impose sanctions against UNITA as recommended by the then UN Secretary-General Boutros-Boutros Ghali was ended despite Savimbi’s tactical proclamation of September 19, 1993 that UNITA would observe a unilateral ceasefire and a suspension of a prolonged siege of the Angolan city of Cuito.

Despite the unanimous 15-0 UN Security council vote in support of sanctions, UNITA and its allies and supporters continued to smuggle diamond and fuel mined from areas of Angola which it had overrun into Zaire. Sales of these products were designed to weaken psychologically the diplomatic and economic impacts of the sanction. Nonetheless, serious and far-reaching actions against UNITA that might at least cripple its ability to wage war against the Angolan central government continued. Resolution to expel UNITA’s representatives from foreign capitals and also freeze the movement’s assets was voted on November 1, 1993. At the same time, many western countries, including Britain announced their willingness to resume the supply of arms to the MPLA government which was earlier suspended in compliance with the May 1991 peace agreement.

NIGERIA

Since Nigeria’s independence from Britain on October 1, 1960, its two democratic governments – first and second republics existed prior to the June 12, 1993 failed presidential elections. The first democratic government –the first republic had Nnamdi Azikiwe and Alhaji Abubakar Tafawa Balewa as its President and Prime Minister respectively. Their government reigned from 1960 to January 15, 1966 when it was cut short by the military coup of Major General Aguiyi Ironsi.
Since then, the evolution of Nigerian government has taken a rocky path. Nigeria has experienced a series of military interventions, among which have been the July 29, 1966 coup of Yakubu Gowon; and the Nigerian civil war, 1967 – 1970; the Murtala Muhammed/ Olusegun Obasanjo coup of July 29, 1975, until a multiparty democratic government was installed on October 1, 1979. This democratically elected government (second republic) was unfortunately short-lived when its mandate under the leadership of Alhaji Shehu Shagari and his then Vice-President Alex Ekwueme was interrupted by the Muhammadu Buhari’s coup of December 31, 1983; and then the Ibrahim Babangida takeover of government on August 27, 1985.

Hope for Nigeria’s third chance for a democratic election was raised in January 1986 when the military government of Ibrahim Babangida announced its intention to hand over power in 1992. This date was continually postponed until June 12, 1993 presidential election which was annulled or cancelled on June 23, 1993. Prior to the election, many steps were taken by the Babangida administration to put the democratic transition in motion. In 1986, the government formed a political bureau to formulate a blueprint compatible with a constitutional form of government. Based on a one-year study by this body, a two-party system was recommended for Nigeria with some degree of government control even though at the time a total of 49 political associations or parties had emerged. Out of this number, two parties were officially selected. Their finances and their platforms were influenced by the government. The official parties were National Republican Convention (NRC) and the Social Democratic Party (SDP), with Tom Ikimi and Baba Gana Kingibe as their chairmen respectively. Both Chairmen were later sacked in consequent political shuffle by the Babangida administration.

The principle behind the institutional control alluded to here by the report is what has been dubbed “guided democracy” and occurs when “a military regime retains virtually complete control over the transition process, which in the words of Martin, Guy (1993) is deliberately complex and prolonged. This, argued Oyediran, O. & Agbaje, A. (1991) was followed by a decree promulgated in May 1989 that prohibited political parties from accepting campaign contributions; required them to be registered with the National Electoral Commission (NEC); to be less parochial and to make Abuja their headquarter.

1987 saw the creation of the Directorate of Mass Mobilization for Economic Recovery and Self Reliance and Social Justice (MAMSER). MAMSER was designed to embark on mass education of the Nigerian electorate for the purpose of inculcating a new political culture and attitude consistent with the principles of popular democracy. The measure, argued Onuaguluchi, Gilbert (1990) was also aimed to encourage democratic practices and help sustain the political system in the post-military era.

As a reform-minded action, decree No. 25 of 1987 was evoked. Its goal was to bar or ban veteran politicians who were widely perceived as corrupt from active politics in lieu of a new cadre of candidates who were both professionals and technocrats thought to be more supportive of reform movements and good government crusaders; a practice which contravenes the basic tenets of popular democracy; and has been condemned by many prominent Nigerian politicians and academics, including novelist Chinua Achebe. This Criterion led to the disqualification of formidable candidates for president like Lateef Jakande, Alhaji Muhammadu Abubkar Rimi, Arthur Nzeribe and Shehu Musa Yar’adua.

Inspite of all the electoral reshuffles, in terms of candidates and calendar, the final date for presidential election was set on June 12, 1993. In national convention held March 26- 30, 1993 in Port Harcourt, Rivers State, the NRC through its primary balloting nominated Alhaji Bashir Othman Tofa its party candidate for President, with Dr. O. Nwobodo as his running mate. The latter was later dropped, and Sylvester Ugoh finally selected as Vice-Presidential candidate. On the other hand, the SDP held its party convention on June 12, 1993. In its primary election process in Jos, Capital of Plateau State the party nominated Moshood Abiola its presidential candidate with Tom Ikimi, a one-time NRC Chairman as his deputy.

The general elections for President took place on June 12, 1993 in defiance of an Abuja High Court order prohibiting it. But, the National Electoral Commission (NEC) Chairman Humphrey Nwosu ignored the order and allowed the election to proceed. This action did not come as a surprise given the fact that the Nigerian government had strengthened the
powers of NEC with Decree No. 48 of 1991 which not only exempted the commission from legal and constitutional constraints, while it gave it unlimited powers to determine the faith of elections.

At the conclusion of the elections, results from 15 of the 30 states of the federation showed that Tofa won only 3 states while Abiola led in 12. Based on this trend and reality, it would appear that Abiola’s clear victory was indisputable. The incremental release of the election results which was officially scheduled June 13 -20 1993 was aborted when the group called Association for Better Nigeria which was also supported by Babangida filed a lawsuit in an Abuja High Court asking for an injunction to suspend further electoral activities including the official announcement of the electoral returns from the remaining states. The organization had charged election malpractices like voter intimidation and rigging as the basis for its litigation. The court injunction was obtained by the group and NEC concurred by postponing election activities till further notice.

On June 23, 1993 President Babangida annulled the election results, dissolved NEC and cancelled the entire transition exercise or program. Both presidential candidates Tofa and Abiola were then disqualified on a flimsy excuse that based on an unwritten set of requirements, each candidate must not be less than 50 years old, belong to a party for at least a year; and not spend money on political campaigns. It should be noted that Abiola and Tofa reported their ages to be 55 and 46 years old respectively. Each candidate was later accused by the government of spending more than 60 million dollars canvassing for votes. Nonetheless, Babangida promised that two new candidates from the two parties would be picked and that a new incremental release of the election results which was officially scheduled June 13 -20 1993 was aborted when the group called Association for Better Nigeria which was also supported by Babangida filed a lawsuit in an Abuja High Court asking for an injunction to suspend further electoral activities including the official announcement of the electoral returns from the remaining states. The organization had charged election malpractices like voter intimidation and rigging as the basis for its litigation. The court injunction was obtained by the group and NEC concurred by postponing election activities till further notice.

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The nullification of the elections triggered a string of protests organized by the Campaign for Democracy against the Babangida government on July 5, 1993 which reportedly claimed over 100 lives. The second round of this mass campaign continued from August 12-14, 1993 paralyzing businesses mostly in the southwest of the country including Lagos and Ibadan. This region which is inhabited mostly by the ethnic Yoruba of Nigeria formed the bedrock of Abiola’s support, their “native son”.

Nevertheless, Chief Ernest Shonekan was sworn in on August 27, 1993 as the Interim President with a mandate to organize and administer fresh presidential elections in February 1994. In order to win public sympathy and support, Shonekan embarked on incremental public policy strategies. For example, while ordering the release of detained human rights activists, he fell short of opening media houses closed by the government on the ground that such actions fell under the province of the national legislature.

By November 1993, the malaise that gripped the nation had taken its toll both politically and economically. In response, Shonekan on November 8, 1993 announced a 700 percent fuel price hike. The perceived impact of this on interest rate and cost of living on an average worker ushered in a new wave of labor unrest. The Nigerian Labor Congress (NLC) went on a prolonged strike after its three-day ultimatum to force the government to rescind the order failed.

On November 10, 1993, the Shonekan government’s popularity was undermined by the ruling of Justice Dolapo Akinsanya of the Lagos High Court that it was illegal. The court had found in a case filed by Moshood Abiola that Decree 61 which established Shonekan’s caretaker or interim government was unconstitutional on the basis that Ibrahim Babangida lacked the constitutional right at the time to sign the Decree.

By mid-November, the ineffectiveness of the transitional government was pronounced, and its days counted. Thus, the takeover of the government on November 17, 1993 by General Sani Abacha, the Defense Minister under Shonekan was uneventful. Abacha wasted no time to abolish all the democratic structures already in place in almost a decade of Babangida’s transition to civilian rule. In an attempt to consolidate power, Abacha purged some elements in the military. The undertaking affected among others, Brigadier Generals John Shagaya and Halilu Akilu who were retired on November 27, 1993.

On December 9, 1993, the government installed Military Governors to head the 30 states of the federation and the Federal Capital Territory (Abuja). Surprisingly, Abacha’s federal cabinet comprised a number of its opponents, including Alhaji Baba Kingibe, Abiola’s running mate in the June elections who had been appointed Foreign Minister and Dr. Olu Onaguruwa who was selected as Justice Minister and Attorney General.
General of the Federation. Onaguruwa was the attorney who defended pro-democracy campaigners arrested by Babangida’s regime in 1992 and an ardent critic of military rule.

Other enemies of the administration coopted or won over with appointments included Iyorchia Ayu, a key member of the National assembly later sacked for his pro-Abiola views and stance. He was appointed Education Minister in the Abacha government. Moreover, Abubakar Rimi and Lateef Jakande, former popular Governors of Kano State and Lagos state respectively who also campaigned and helped Abiola win their states joined the new administration. Even Alex Ibru, publisher of the Guardian Newspaper, a respected national independent newspaper that resisted and continually published stinging editorials critical of the annulment of the June elections was inducted into the new regime.

While critics saw these developments as mere cooptation by the government and opportunism on the part of the appointees, supporters saw it as a strategy of nation-building by the Abacha regime. However, the allure of a constitutional conference to discuss the political future of Nigeria endured. According to Paul Adams (1994), the scenario for selecting members to the body would involve the choosing of five candidates from each of the 6,000 (Six thousand) wards in the federation. Then, the successful candidates from each group would then form an electoral college that would choose the 270 delegates to the conference on May 28, 1994.

The exercise to select delegates to the Constitutional Assembly was a failure in the Western States and Lagos in particular. Here, sympathy for Moshood Abiola was very strong. Also, the activities and pressures from the National Democratic Coalition (NADECO) which opposed the cancellation of the democratic elections of June 1993 led to the last-minute withdrawal of prominent candidates for the Constitutional Committees, including former Finance Minister Olu Falae and Ex-Secretary General of the Economic Community for Africa Adebayo Adeyemi. Also, in broad coalition with NADECO was the Eastern Mandate Union with broad support in the Middle Belt, the East and Southeastern regions of Nigeria. On the contrary, select influential politicians defied the call to boycott the elections for delegates to the Constitutional Conference. They included Sam Mbakwe, former Governor of Imo State and Shehu Yar’Adua who represented the Northern District of Katsina.

Regardless of these political moves, the Nigerian political impasse which had paralyzed its economic activities still lingered. The situation was further exacerbated by the sudden arrest and imprisonment of Abiola on the charge for treason in June 1994 after declaring himself authentic and legitimate President of Nigeria. In support of Abiola’s release, two powerful oil unions, Nupeng and Pergasson went on strike. This episode, argued Versi, Anver (1994) resulted in many factories being idled and mass public transportation systems reduced to a grinding halt. According to Africa Business, Nigeria’s oil production in mid-August 1994 fell by more than a quarter (25%) from the normal quota of 1.95 million barrels of oil per day.

In October 1994, General Abacha in a televised broadcast to the nation warned that it was time Nigeria faced up to its international debt problems. The announcement took place a few days after the Pius Okigbo Commission released its findings on the management of Nigerian revenue. The investigation found that the previous military administrations squandered the bulk of 12.2 billion Naira of oil windfall realized during the Gulf War. Even, government announcement that the price of gasoline was cut was insufficient to restore public confidence in government. As a matter of fact, Nigerians feverishly and in disbelief watched their government slowly and quietly drift into anarchy.

Toward Democratic Sustenance in Africa

The institutionalization, nurturing and sustenance of true and lasting democratic systems of governance in Africa would require the enforcement of the following principles:

Instituting Multiparty Democracy

There is great need in Africa for political reform that will eventually result or culminate in accountability. In other words, maintaining a system of government that holds elected leaders responsible for their conducts while in office in order to respond to the needs and wishes of the masses. This is desirable in the backdrop of the fact that in several African countries, their political experiences have been under single-
party or military dictatorships. With lack of political competition, separation of power and checks and balance instruments at work, these regimes have often been marred by corruption, suppression of free press, mismanagement of resources, political instability and ethnic division.

**Doing away with Dictatorship, Authoritarianism and the Cult of Personality**

Most African political leaders appear to always strive under cult of personality. This is a political culture that stresses total obedience to a leader which unfortunately makes them to be above the law. This type of emphasis on political symbols of elevating leaders as “fathers of the nation” is always exploited by most African leaders during elections. The condition is even worsened by the fact that illiteracy rate in most African countries is very high. Thus, improvement in mass education will be desperately needed so as to help refocus democracy on guarding institutions rather than as opposed to personalities (men). This is not surprising in light of the report by Africa Library Project (2011) which found that in sub-Saharan Africa, youth literacy rates (ages 15-24) are the lowest of any region. According to Almond, Gabriel A., and Sidney Verba (1963), there is a “parochial” political culture at play here, in which citizens are detached and alienated from participating in politics. With little or no education, they are mostly uninformed and unaware of how their government works including the “social contract” in terms of their role in government vis-a-vis those of their rulers. In the end, citizens take no interest in the political process. In other words, the system is less democratic, and many citizens do not care being citizens. Also, they pay little or no attention to problems, and have little knowledge and information about their government, and thus resulting in seldom or rare political participation and feeling of powerlessness.

The neutralization of the cult of personality will help improve and uphold the basic rights of citizens because good and effective leadership needs to obey the rule of law as well as recognize democratic order that sets the boundaries between the ruler and subjects. In governments where there is an imperial leader or king, state monopoly of power and the disregard for individual liberties and freedoms have resulted in government delegitimization and therefore a breakdown and erosion of democracy. Hence, civil education is a good means of encouraging masses to know their rights and the ways through which they can defend them. Also, social contract between rulers and their subjects is an effective element and feature of democracy. In a nutshell, while government is conferred with legitimacy through the votes of citizens the state is obliged to and expected to reciprocate in its end with honoring and respecting the social contract by providing public goods, which reflect or symbolize the will and wishes of the people.

**Deemphasizing Zero-Sum Game and Installing Win-Win Brand or Strand of Politics**

In many African nations, the leaders tend to look at politics in life-and-death prism or lenses. That is, they see politics as a means of enriching themselves, rewarding friends and punishing their real or perceived enemies that can take place in a win-loss (zero sum game) as opposed to a win-win environment and outcome. Hence, these types of mindsets and attitudes have resulted in elected leaders sending their political opponents into prison and in some cases, eliminating them altogether. This type of culture according to Johnson, Charles A (1976) is what Daniel Elazar referred to as “individualistic” political culture where citizens and leaders see politics as a market place in which they participate based on private motivations and need. As opposed to “moralistic” political culture that stresses or emphasizes politics as means to do good in society by serving public interest and establishing good, equitable and just society on the long run.

The negative effect is that this heightens ethnic tensions by pitting one ethnic, religious, linguistic or regional groups against one another – the advantaged versus the marginalized particularly in multi-ethnic and multilingual complex societies such as Nigeria, Cameroon or South Africa. The way to build political consensus would henceforth involve bargaining, coalition building, as well as sharing of power, rewards, political appointments and even infrastructural development. Failure to build an inclusive government will give rise to unintended consequences such as political instability, ethnic and regional strife and conflict that will threaten national integration, consolidation and development in Africa.
**Demilitarization of Politics**

Military intervention has become the Achilles’ heel or vulnerability of modern African politics, and thus undermines smooth change of government and democracy. One solution will be to control and transform the role of the military in African societies. It will be difficult to have a civil society under the cloud of military intervention threats against civilian elected governments. This has been one of the problems of political transition in Africa, as were the cases in Nigeria, Algeria and Angola. The plague of military involvement and coups in African politics has become one of the biggest political challenges facing post-independence African nations since after emerging from colonial rule.

Many theories have been proposed to justify military intervention in Africa. First, the Environmentalist Theory hypothesized by Samuel Huntington (1969) argues that in the absence of strong social and political institutions to maintain law and order, and the rule of law, the military is tempted to jump into politics in order to restore effective, legitimate and stable government. Next, the Custodian theory hypothesis advanced by Huntington (1976); Finer (1975) and Thompson (2004). The theory states that when the military sees itself as the custodian of the state and its constitution, it engages in coup particularly when it feels that the civilian regime is failing the nation; and as an alternative and as custodian would involve in politics to correct the societal anomalies. Moreover, the Political Development Theory popularized by Huntington (1976); Finer (1975) and Putnam (1967), believes that the propensity, chance or probability for military intervention in government decreases with increasing popular participation and involvement in electoral politics.

Regardless of the motives of the military in African politics, what is indisputable is that African militaries do not respect the political boundaries but rather dabble in politics for a host of reasons and motivations, including ideology, religion, ethnicity and regionalism. Therefore, they must find a reason within these broad rationales to justify their uninvited involvement and meddling in African politics. In the Nigerian Presidential election case as an example, held in Nigeria on 12 June 1993, results showed victory for Moshood Abiola (Social Democratic Party) against competitor Bashir Tofa of the National Republican Convention Party. However, the elections were later annulled by military ruler Ibrahim Babangida who intervened and plunged the Nigerian nation into a crisis that eventually ended with Sani Abacha leading a coup later in the year.

Regional and ethnic bias by leaders who dominate and control the instruments of violence by virtue of their dominance in police and military establishments and bureaucracies appears to give rise to societal fragmentation and disintegration. In many cases such as the military coup in Nigeria in 1966 led to temporary Nigerian dissolution and dismemberment when the eastern region broke a way as a sovereign republic of Biafra under Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu. It should be noted that the Biafran secession resulted in the Nigeria-Biafra war 1967 – 1970 and finally culminating in Biafran surrender and its eventual reunification with Nigeria.

**Managing Ethnic Diversity**

There is broad recognition that ethnic tensions in Africa have often led to inter-ethnic clashes, violence, civil wars and tensions that undermine democratic rule. Cases are not far-fetched but evident in Nigeria and Zimbabwe etc. African countries in transition to democracy must find ways to deal with the challenges and menace imposed by ethnic differences. In order to promote national integration and consolidation, African nations must desist from suppressing ethnic identities and aspirations especially where ethnic minorities and groups demand and agitate for equal treatment and access to development and rights to self-determination. The politicization of ethnic identities and repression of some by another are a primary source of conflict. Thus, promoting inter-ethnic coexistence will involve balancing of interests of competing groups through bargaining, providing equal opportunities in terms of education, health and merit-based system of employment and development, contracts, college admission and appointment to posts and promotion in the government bureaucracies. In rare cases, affirmative action programs may be needed to ensure or guarantee that disadvantaged and marginalized groups and regions are not excluded or left behind from meaningful
Empowerment of Women

The marginalization and suppression of women is one of the major causes of poverty and inequality among women in Africa. The magnitude of the problem is incomprehensible if one factors in the role of women as major care givers and family guardian. Cultural and religious practices are not immune when discussing the causes of poverty among women. They include women/ wife inheritance practices such among the Igbo of Southeastern Nigeria where women are banned from claiming any rights to their parents’ property when they die regardless of the presence of testament (written will) by late parents or not. Other practices that shortchange women in Africa include: polygamy – the practice of marrying many wives in the midst many mouths to feed and limited education, skills and earning by the breadwinner who is mainly the father.; Arranged child marriage, where the daughters are usually given out into marriage with little or no education thereby fueling the “cycle of poverty” in the family. Another customary practice in Africa is the Osu caste system, an ancient practice in Igboland that discourages social interaction and promotes discrimination and marriage with a group of persons called Osu and referred to by Igbo of Nigeria as “outcast”).

The Osu are dedicated to the deities (Alusi/ gods) of Igboland. They and their descendants are considered inferior beings and are usually separated from the native/ real born (Nwadiala or diala). All these practices no doubt are the major threats to poverty and inequality among women in Africa. These ancient practices top the list of reasons why Africa countries rank at the bottom of Human Development Index rankings. The presence of all these self-reinforcing mechanisms appear to spell the “poverty trap” in which they persist from generation to generation to the extent that the “cycle of poverty” is hard to break particularly among women regardless of steps taken to eliminate it. Wide-spread poverty in Africa has nothing to do with the availability of wealth but unequal distribution and redistribution, hence leading to what many scholars call “poverty paradox” depicting the fact that abject poverty in Africa exists in the midst of plenty despite the fact that Africa is endowed with enormous mineral resources that generate wealth.

In Africa, the faces of inequality and poverty are the women, thus leading to the “feminization of poverty” paradigm. Gender discrimination against women is manifested in the career women are steered into - low pay, and lack of political power. Other scholars including Acemoglu, Daron & Robinson, James (2012) take a cultural and religious perspective to explain Africa’s marginalization. This is where this explanation and narrative fit in. The cultural hypothesis argues that most Africans are culturally socialized into certain behaviors and attitudes that perpetuate the subjugation of women.

Although women are the majority in Africa in terms of population, their rate of participation in government and the labor force is low. Logically, the neglect of at least half of Africa’s population poses a threat to the political development and modernization in Africa. The condition of African women especially with respect to illiteracy affects Africa negatively as regards family planning, child care, health, labor participation, and income generation. Women in Africa face discrimination both in de facto and de jure/ legal sense. In Africa, gender discrimination is not only reinforced but codified by cultural and religious practices that determine their wellbeing and quality of life. Promotion of gender-based equality between men and women will go a long way in promoting democracy. Effecting change in the fate of women in Africa would involve changes in the laws and their vigorous enforcement affirming the equality of men and women. Next will be through socialization that promotes gender-based equality between men and women. Also, public media campaigns emphasizing legal/ constitutional rights of women vis-à-vis men should be mobilized. Furthermore, there should be serious efforts to close the gender-gap in pay and income designed to elevate and equalize the pay and earning ability of women with those of men and enhancing their potentials to feed and take care of their families.

Finally, improving education for women in every field including STEM will help boost their rate of employability and income, and thereby using income as the “great equalizer” where women education would increase their participation rates in politics, employment and the economy. Hence, an increase or improvement in the role women play in modern
African societies will enormously help the transition to democratic rule and governance in Africa.

**Operation and Maintenance of Legitimate Governments**

Many countries in Africa, such as Somalia, Burundi, Sudan, Chad and the Democratic Republic of Congo are failed state. Hence, they show characteristics such as loss of physical control of their territories, erosion of legitimate authority to make collective decisions; inability to provide reasonable public service, and failure in their foreign policy and relations due to their inability to interact with other states as full members of the international community. Furthermore, such countries show manifestations of social indicators for their vulnerable existence – demographic pressures with respect to population and food security; massive refugee movement and internal displacement as evident in Sudan and caused by the activities of Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) and Nigeria in terms of Boko Haram insurgency. There are also legacies of vengeance-seeking group grievances such as in Nigeria and French and English-speaking Cameroon. Other social indicators include chronic and sustained human flight (emigration) and brain drain. Uneven economic development along ethnic, religious or regional lines; and sharp and severe economic decline. Moreover, there are manifestations of political indicators of state failure in Africa to include criminalization and delegitimization of the states, widespread violations of human rights, security challenges, rise of factionalized elites and intervention of other states.

To achieve legitimacy – feeling that government rule is rightful and therefore should be obeyed, or the voluntary acceptance of one’s authority to act or perform task, African nations should adopt the following measures designed to achieve legitimacy: adopting and maintaining fair and free elections, good governance, and structure of government conducive to participatory democracy such as fair representation in government and political inclusiveness. Other measures include fighting corruption, avoiding a vicious cycle of violent conflict, fighting mass poverty, good governance with culture of smooth political transition, equality and improved governance environment that guarantees fairness and equality as well as prolonged and lasting political and social security.

Increased legitimacy is essential or crucial to democratic success in Africa. This will include the creation of open political space for civil society and help government to resolve crises of the state and its ineffectiveness and incompetence in development. Government should be able to withstand the forces that work against it by developing the ability and capacity to withstand the test of time – such as the ability to maintain a smooth and orderly political transition from authoritarianism to democracy. Hence, it will be able to increase its legitimacy through the free and fair election of its leaders, as well as operate within the confines of the constitutional frameworks of separation of powers and functions, checks and balances.

A competent government should also maintain its sovereignty and independence by not being compromised by virtue of its overreliance on foreign aid, debts and entanglements. Hence, there should be reciprocal bargaining between the state and civil society – churches, the media, political parties and trade unions/ lobbies or interest groups that will emerge as a counterweight to the state. However, civil society has to be free of political machination, incorruptible, free from cooption or being won over because the independence of civil society will help check the excesses or extraordinary power of the state. Also, strong civil society is desirable because it plays the role of articulating public values and resisting unnecessary state control and dictatorship.

Furthermore, strong and committed civil society is needed because it also promotes or enhances public culture and also serves as pressure group or lobby to help democratize government and create enabling environment for democracy to flourish. – That is, to keep the culture of political discourse, questioning and resisting entrenched authority alive. The presence of a strong and resilient civil society in Africa is a sine qua non or prerequisite for successful democracy as well as an indicator of the tolerance level of government with respect to the rights of expression and assembly (civil rights and civil liberties) of citizens.

**Conclusion**

The end of the cold war ushered in a new era of democracy in Africa. Democratic successes in countries such as Ghana, Cameroon, Kenya and
Senegal support this claim. Yet, failure of democratic experiments in Nigeria, Algeria and Angola suggest that the post-cold war political period has mixed results, and that the era of dictatorship, absolutism and a steady threat to multiparty democracy in Africa was not over, even after the end of the Cold War in 1991.

In the case of Algeria, the failure of the past civilian governments to manage its social and economic problems, and adequately direct its social reforms made Islamic faith a promising alternative. Thus, when the Islamic movement was translated into a formidable political party, it campaigned on the establishment of a theocratic form of government based on Islamic law – Sharia. The revolutionary, radical and unyielding and uncompromising nature of this government as suggested by events and experiences of governments in Nigeria, Iran, Tunisia and Sudan appeared to threaten the national integration and unity of Algeria. This provided the military with the excuse to stage a coup in order to halt the ascent to power by the religious fundamentalists who clearly won the democratic elections.

The solution to this type of injustice would be to restore FIS to power. But, it was not likely to be due to strict controls placed on Islamic movements in Algeria. The military had cracked down on supporters of FIS. Ruthless strategies of unwarranted arrests, imprisonment without due process or trial and other repressive methods and tactics that were adopted by the government backfired. As the regime lost legitimacy, it became vulnerable to popular descent. Thanks to the efforts of President Lamine Zeroual for seeking a negotiated settlement to the Algerian challenge.

The Angolan scenario presented problems of reconciliation. Two personalities who fought each other in the post-Angolan independence civil wars refused to compromise – Savimbi of UNITA and Dos Santos of MPLA. Savimbi declined to concede defeat in the elections. One reason might be that he did not want to appear like a loser because his stature and standing both at home and abroad would diminish particularly after withstanding the Angolan national army in battle for almost two decades. It should be recalled that during the cold war, his UNITA movement had dealt with foreign governments. UNITA had also received military, moral and financial assistance from the Reagan administration in the United States who saw the movement as a bulwark to Soviet expansion in Africa.

However, the threat of Jonas Savimbi and his movement to the Angolan government was minimized. First, UNITA, throughout the period the UN supervised elections in Angola was discredited and more international support and sympathy shifted to the MPLA. Also, the American policy toward Angola changed in favor of MPLA government under the Clinton administration resulting in the recognition of Angola as an independent and sovereign state. Even South Africa, its old ally and neighbors nubbed UNITA under ANC-controlled government; and was also restrained by the Brazzaville Protocol which it signed on December 13, 1988 that prohibited it from interfering in the internal affairs of its neighbors.

Due to lack of international support, UNITA failed to sustain a viable insurgent movement. Eventually, it gradually fizzled just like its one-time nemesis, rival or archenemy the FNLA of Holden Roberto which disbanded in the 1970s.

The Nigerian dilemma raised unique questions about the politics of ethnicity, religion and regionalism. On the regional level, the premature cancellation of the elections had a lot of implication for Nigeria. First, it reinforced popular notion that Nigerian politics had been steered in a way to retain, revolve and consolidate power in the hands of the Hausa ethnic group of the North. It is worth mentioning that the winning presidential candidate based on the results of the preliminary ballots counted, was Moshood Abiola, a southerner of Yoruba ethnic stock. Many people doubted whether the process could have been aborted had Tofa, a northerner of Hausa background had won the election.

Secondly, various groups in different regions lost faith in the political system which prides itself as a promoter and guarantor of justice and equality. That meant that peaceful institutional means might not be regarded as effective means to make demands on the political system or even to change it. Unconventional means like strikes, demonstinations and riots proved more attractive and were bound to gain traction as the crisis of confidence grew.

Another implication of the Nigerian political malaise was that it exposed the extremities of cooption and political patronage pertinent to the system. It showed how the politics of
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integrity and principle (honest politics) had given way to selfishness, opportunism and the pursuit of other parochial interests by majority of Nigerian politicians. This was demonstrated in the way subsequent Nigerian administrations won the loyalty of their enemies and critics by way of appointments and other kinds of inducements to the dismay of the masses. An example was the induction or cooptation of Abiola’s supporters, including his running-mate Baba Gana Kingibe into Sani Abacha’s government.

The damage done to national solidarity brought by the nullification of the June 12, 1993 Presidential elections left a deep wound in the national psyche that would take a long time to heal. Even, General Abacha’s promise of a Constitutional Conference to discuss the political future of Nigeria which antagonists saw as a delay tactic designed to prolong military rule was not enough to remedy this perceived injustice.

Relations among the regions and ethnic groups, including national solidarity have suffered. The long-term implication of this political fragmentation is that the Abacha Administration found it difficult to govern because most people did not give it the cooperation it needed in order to be effective.

Furthermore, wide-spread regional and ethnic-based alienation denied the government needed regional support necessary for strong national cohesion. If care is not taken, prolonged regional distancing may lead to sustainable regional movements, new agitations for regional autonomy and possibly secession. Nigeria at this juncture was at the crossroads and did not need this experience which after all, plunged it into civil war (Nigeria-Biafra War) in 1967, when its Eastern Region declared itself independent state of Biafra. The war lasted from 1967 till 1970.

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