The Defensive Paradigm of the Popular Mobilization Forces in Iraq and the Degeneration of Divergent Politics

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ABSTRACT

The Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), also known as the People’s Mobilization Committee (PMC) and the Popular Mobilization Units (PMU) is an Iraqi state-sponsored umbrella organization composed of some 40 militias that are mostly Shia Muslim groups, but also including Sunni Muslim, Christian, and Yazidi individuals as well. It can now be claimed that Shabbi’s survival as a popular ideological structure actually filled the gap caused by the “ineffectiveness of the organized structure of the occupation in the post-fallen period of Saddam” and became an intrinsic, efficient and capable force in the field Security has been a development for Iraqi society and government in Iraq. This present article seeks to explain that it is important to rely on people in the military security arena to be more efficient than dependence on military-security security, and therefore, The Popular Mobilization Forces, despite some challenges, has had great achievements in the military security scene. In so far as the ineffectiveness of Washington’s military-security approaches was more than predictive and led to security building on ideological and popular beliefs.

Keywords: The Popular Mobilization Forces, Authority, Basic Security, US Security Approach, ISIS Supporters.

INTRODUCTION

The Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) can be regarded as the most emerging military, popular and ideological force in Iraq and even the region, which, within the framework of the resistance, is compatible with Hezbollah Lebanon, Ansarullah Yemen and Hamas of Palestine, performing important functions and focussing on military and security developments. This Force is particularly in the war against ISIS (Haji Yousefi & Joneidi, 2018:293). This force, which includes various sections, was formed in 2014 after the fall of important cities such as Mosul and Tikrit, by the Islamic State and welcomed by the people; government support and political forces were also formed, and the Islamic Republic of Iran, at the request of the Iraqi government, played a significant role in pursuit, formation and development of its power (Darwishi & Vatan Khah, 2017: 9).

However, the formation of The Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) has given the Iraqi society and government an unparalleled opportunity to exploit this potentially human potential for deepening and expanding the discourse of the “basic security of the people” rather than relying on the alien power. The present research seeks to answer the question "How and to what extent has the role and place of secession in securing the development, with regard to the security approaches of the United States in Iraq?"

In other words, the popular mobilization of Iraq in comparison with the great foreign powers how has the security equation in Iraq affected? Accordingly, the main hypothesis of this study was, in fact, based on the question raised on the basis that the formation of a force called "The Popular Mobilization Force" has been very influential in creating the security of the people of the base and has increased the belief in the security power of the people in Iraqi policymakers. In the sense that advocates and advocates of the Shahi Sha'abi seek to strengthen it in different ways because of their strength and ability, while the opposition and its enemies, in the face of disaster, seek to destroy, weaken or diminish its role; In such a way that they have realized their power and ability, and
they are going to give this phenomenon a religious-religious character. Of course, it should be acknowledged that contrary to the approaches of some Arab countries, such as Saudi Arabia, in giving a particular identity to this movement, the Shabbi has led to an ethnoreligious character and gained some popularity from non-Hispanic geographic regions of Iraq. This was seen more than anything else during the Iraqi parliamentary elections of 2018 and Iraqi public opinion in the al-Fatih and Al-Saouron coalitions. Hence, it seems to be necessary to put an end to the clamor of a policy in order to pass Iraq on identity-ethnic challenges. Of course, this does not necessarily mean the introduction of a hasty shah in the realm of politics, but the political arena in Iraq can also exploit the already established capacities of a pre-emptive model (Alishahi; Pakzad & Mahdiipour, 2019: 31).

The specific purpose of the present study is, in addition to knowing the extent of its structure, its impact on the current and future developments of Iraq towards the creation of security and, consequently, the field of politics. The subject matter of the research is therefore important to make Iraq, as one of the anti-currents in Iraq, a valuable experience in the field of security, and recognizing its strengths and weaknesses for policy-making in the future of Iraq and even the region is very important. Therefore, this research can be a starting point for other research in this field. It is also important to examine the issue from other aspects and exploit the experiences gained in Iraq by popular forces in order to secure security in other areas.

**METHODLOGY**

The hypothesis of this article has been tested on the basis of the combined methods of historical sociology and futures studies, and research data has been compiled based on the library and internet methodology.

**BACKGROUND AND FORMATION (PMF)**

The People's Mobilization Forces (PMF) were formed by the Iraqi government on 15 June 2014 after top Iraqi Shia cleric Ali al-Sistani's non-sectarian, and when ISIS has invaded vast areas of Iraq. There are about 40 volunteer armed groups which has an estimated 118,000 combatants, of whom more than 60,000 were involved in the war with ISIS. Mostly the Iraqi Shi'a structure and militant structure are formed, but later the Sunni tribesmen joined Salah al-Din, Nineveh and Anbar provinces, as well as the Kurdish Fili and Iraqi Christians (Mossallanejad, 2015: 15). One of the most important groups in the development of the Islamic Republic can be found in groups such as Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, Sarya’Al-Salam, Taliba al-Khorasani, Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shohada, Hezbollah al-Najab’s movement, Kata’ib Hezbollah and... The operational areas of this force consisted mainly of Baghdad, Babylon, Diyala, Salah al-Din, Anbar and al-Garma from the strategic functions of the Fallujah city in Anbar. Currently, its leaders are: Faleh al-Fayyaz, Abu Mohmandi, Engineer and Hadi al-Amiri are prominent figures in Iraq’s political and political arena (Alishahi & Mohammad Doust, 2017: 82).

The most important reason for the uprising of the Islamic Revolution can be read in the events of Iraq after the ISIS outbreak. ISIS extremists managed to capture Mosul and many parts of Salah al-Din and Diyala provinces in a short period of time, and even went to Baghdad near the capital of Iraq. The inability and fragmentation of the Iraqi Army (as part of a post-Saddam-backed military-security military arrangement) in the face of ISIS’s terrorists, the political-religious elites forced Iraq to take new measures to confront this group (Mohammad-doust, Khodayari & Alishahi, 2017: 58). Consequently, with the guidance of some Iraqi politicians and the protection of religious authorities, a popular force was formed in the form of a grassroots campaign to fight ISIS and defend Iraqi sovereignty, and with a high spirit and incredible enthusiasm entered ISIS (Alishahi & Forouzan, A,2018: 4).

The most important gains after the establishment of the present can be described in the form of several strategic victories, most notably the liberation of Jorf al-Nasr (formerly al-Jorf al-Sakhr in northern Babylon, later liberated by the People's Mobilization Forces (PMF) forces, Jorf al-Nasr, and one of the first operations Succeeding popular forces). The liberation of Amerli, the liberation of al-Alam, al-Baghdadi, and the liberation of Tikrit. In sum, these popular forces were deployed very quickly.
in the southern, northern, and western parts of the Baghdad belt to fill the gaps and play a significant role in stopping the ISIS movement, given the excellent coordination between the security forces and the security forces of the State Security Forces (Montazeran & Ghorbani, 2017: 78).

Accordingly, despite the negative security and political consequences of ISIS's massive exodus to Iraq on June 4, 2014, positive results were also gained by the Iraqi government and the Iraqi society, and the rule of "creating security by the people for the people" caused a precipitous rise. Meanwhile, the role of Ayatollah Sistani's awareness and his religious authority was well defined at the appropriate time to declare the "necessity of jihad" (Nasirzadeh & Gouderzi, 2017: 269). In this regard, Supreme Leader of the Islamic Supreme Leader Sayyid Ammar Hakim states: "Ayatollah Sistani has had an enormous influence in bringing the youth together based on their ideas and ideals in defense of their religion, sacredness and religion, and these motives have given these popular forces a power that goes beyond the force of arms on the battlefield." He then commented on the US-US security approach: "These weapons are not decisive in the war, as we are seeing America possessing the most advanced weapons in the world, but it cannot engage in major wars such as Afghanistan, Iraq, and Other areas where it has a role to play. This suggests that spiritual and spiritual dimensions and beliefs are the basis of victory in wars, which is clearly visible in popular forces, and that is why they are bravely fighting ISIS". Because of this - the popular forces were able to change the balance of power in Iraq. Anyway, today Iraq faces a lot of problems, and one of the most important of these problems is the security forces of this country. One of the strengths of the Iraqi security scene is the shaky existence and their presence on the path to jihad in the path of God"Jamshidi, & Mohseni, 2018: 15).

**THE AXIAL MOBILIZATION PATTERN IN THE PEOPLE'S MOBILIZATION FORCES (PMF)**

On Friday, June 13, 2014, Sheikh Mahdi al-Karbala'i, the representative of Ayatollah Sistani in the sermons of the Friday prayer of Imam Hussein's shrine in Karbala Mal'a'ah, declared Jihad compulsory and said: "Anyone who can carry arms And anyone who has the ability to deal with the terrorists should volunteer to cope with them, because defending Iraq is a national duty". Therefore, the The People's Mobilization Forces was formed by Mostly Shiite military forces after the fall of Mosul by ISIS in June 2014. Some Iraqi officials have described these forces as "continuing mobilization in Iraq," while others emphasize the mobilization of the model in its formation and expansion. Aqil Hosseini, a senior member of the People's Mobilization, while pointing out that "People's Mobilization is continuing to mobilize," states that "the Iraqi mobilization is comprised of the Iranian Basij experience." Therefore, the establishment of Hassand al-Sha'bi can be assumed with certainty by forming a similar structure similar to the 20-million-strong Iranian mobilization, which is a unique opportunity for security threats after 2014 in Iraq. In this regard, Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, as senior commanders of The People's Mobilization Forces (PMF), has appreciated this achievement and said: "In less than four years we have been able to create a PMF; a group that uses the capacities of the nation and educates tens of thousands Of volunteering youth, now working as institutions over 90 years of age ". In March 2015, in Baghdad, the commanders of the People's Mobilization Forces (PMF) announced the five objectives of this new structure as follows:

- Combating ISIS and expelling it from Iraqi territory;
- Protection of the country;
- Protection of holy places;
- Freedom of the Iraqi people from terrorism;

In fact, the implementation of the "People's Security Pattern" in Iraq suggests the emergence of an "innovative defensive power" that can be extended to other areas. As it continues, despite the great plurality of Shi'ite Shi'ite forces, they are gathered within a single framework based on the authority of the authority, and this religious affiliation and religious affiliation are the main strength of the organization (Forouzan & Alishahi, 2018: 13).
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THE STRUCTURE AND ORGANIZATION OF THE PEOPLE'S MOBILIZATION FORCES (PMF)

According to a law passed by the Iraqi parliament in 2016, The People's Mobilization Forces (PMF) is being organized under the auspices of the Iraqi prime minister as commander-in-chief of the armed forces, which currently coordinates Falah Fayaa, the Iraqi security officials and field commanders of the structure, Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis and Hadi Ameri. In addition to the Arab Shiite groups, there are six other militia groups in the "PMF". This number has 3,750 Shiite Turkmen forces around Kirkuk, which have joined the Tuz Khurma, Daqq, Bashir, and Amerli areas that join to The People's Mobilization Forces, and are also commanded by Turkmen themselves (Shiroudi, 2015: 93). Apart from the Turkmen, the Sunni Arab tribes are fighting alongside ISIS with PMF. It is estimated that between 4,000 and 7,000 Sunni tribal forces will Cooperation with PMF forces in ISIS War. For example, in the battle of Tikrit, 3,000 operatives in al-Bawasal and Al-Alam were said to have been Sunni tribes. However, the most prominent Sunni tribes along with PMF include the tribes of Al-Jubouri, Hamdani, Lābib, Koyash, Issawi, Habash, Al-Obaidi, Al-Shemar, Al-Khazaj of Tikrit, Al-Azi of Diyala, and 10 tribes of Al-Jurifa, Al-Banemar, Album, Al-Bushheib, Abu Risha, Abu Dhabi, Albufar Al-Bawiytha, Al-Bawasaf and Al-Bufhad, along with other small tribes, have been Sunni armed groups that have fueled Shaabi’s fight against ISIS (Talebi Arani & Gouili Kilaneh, 2016: 109-110).

Shiite reference groups, along with all other smaller groups, are Badr, Iraqi Hezbollah battalions, Asaeb Ahl al-Haq, Seraa al-Islam and the Peace Corps, which are said to have 10 to 15,000 people under their command. These four reference groups are in the category of organizations that had a structure prior to the issuance of the Ayatollah Sistani Fatwa in Iraq, but some of them, such as the Badr Organization, were active in the political affairs field. Of course, the scope of activity of groups is not dependent on their human resource talent. For example, the Seyyed Al-Shohada and Imam Ali battalions operate in different provinces. Meanwhile, the Badr Organization as one of the largest gang members has limited its operations to northern Baghdad, and the Peace Corps have a stronger presence in Karbala and Najaf. Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, in addition to being present in these cities, is also active alongside the Iraqi Hezbollah battalions in Basra and Al-Muthanna. A combination of Sunni Arabs, Christians, Yazidis, and even Kurds of Fili are in popular mobilization, which, despite the creation of some inconsistencies, triggers a quick response power in the PMF. In addition to the four Shia reference groups, as the largest members of the PMF, 38 other groups are also members of the PMF. However, the talent of all active and ready combat troops is between 100 and 120 thousand people. One of the former Badr commanders May 18, 2015, after requesting "Heydar al-Abadi" to intervene in PMF in Anbar, said the facility was able to collect 100,000 troops to take part in the operation to clean up the province (Hossein Pour, Mohammad Moradi & Alishahi, 2019: 19).
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**THE ROLE OF THE AUTHORITY AND THE SEMINARY OFNAJAF IN THE PEOPLE'S MOBILIZATION FORCES (PMF)**

Although Ayatollah Sistani does not have any government position and duties in Iraq, but we cannot claim he has generally abandoned politics and has nothing to do with political affairs. Of course, the notion that he is beyond the sovereignty or abandoned the sovereignty does not apply. His mediation in the clashes between the American occupation with Sadr Process in 2004, the declaration of defense against extremists and terrorists in Iraq in 2014, and the attempt to formulate laws based on the principles of Islam are examples that this confirms this important point [Alishahi; Masoudnia & Forouzan, 2019: 34-35).

It is certain that the Iraqi Shiite authority, and in particular Ayatollah Sistani, played an important and historic role in the development of current rule and the participation of the people in the political process. Similarly, he has consistently called for the legitimate rights of the nation to be the "safety valve" and the advocate for the rights and interests of the Iraqi people. Prior to this, the authority played a huge role in the lack of full consideration of the newly formed government in Iraq after the fall of Saddam to the foundations of secularism and Western liberalism. Also, with power, they brought people to the political scene and provided the ground for universal participation, with the rule of "every Iraqi, one vote", in order to undermine the plans of the Americans for the administration of Iraq. In the course of the formation of the Shabbi Absurd, the issuance of the fatwa of jihad by the Iraqi authorities, in addition to bringing greatness to the area of Najaf Ashraf, brought about the worship of the Ulema and the authorities and given the position of the Iraqi people's jihad and field command in the event of a crisis [Naderi, 2017: 19-20].

The Ayatollah Sistani fatwa effectively eliminated all the geographical and social distances of the people from all walks and put all Muslims, and even the followers of other religions, in front of their immense responsibility in dealing with threats, in a way that united the war against ISIS And made the general public realize that ISIS's actions are in contradiction with the overall performance of Muslims and introduced ISILs as soldiers and forces of arrogance, colonialism and tyranny. Indeed, the authority of the authority has shown that Najaf is the same look, for all Iraqis, and they do not make any difference between their tribes and their tissues, regardless of tribal, racial or religious issues, and for the national interests of Iraq. Resurrection in Iraq once again, as in the 1920s (which was the struggle against colonialism as the reputation of its authority at that time), showed that "the separation of religion from politics" is not possible In this regard, the position of Ayatollah Sistani in society is due to several factors that are: the status of the seminary of Najaf in Iraq, the recognition of the jurisprudential declaration of Ayatollah Sistani, and his democratic views on the developments of this country, Islamic stances And his democratic, with the support and relative satisfaction of all the various ethnic groups and followers of various religions in 2003-2003, made him a model and also forced the occupiers to take part in his proposals in conveying power and drafting the constitution [Mommi; Rostami & Rahimi Lahi,2016: 74-75).

**THE PEOPLE'S MOBILIZATION FORCES (PMF) ACHIEVEMENTS**

The People's Mobilization Forces (PMF) in Iraq, with its victories, could have destroyed the enemy's plans to divide the country and today it has become a powerful arm of the army, police and security forces. Due to the change in (PMF) abduction to a key player in the Iraqi military and security field over the past few years, the promotion and preservation of the achievements of these forces has been of particular importance. In this regard, there are some factors that have greatly influenced the ease of achieving sophisticated achievements. Some of the most important achievements of the popular mobilization force in Iraq are:

- High strength and motivation to confront ISIS and provide security in comparison with other forces on the Iraqi military-security scene;
- The possible continuation of the insecurity and the role of Sunni Shiite and extremist Sunni groups in Iraq, and thus the long-term need for a brutal uprising;
- Gaining experience and success in a broader context; supporting the popular and ideological support of Islamabald;
- Political ties and interactions with other Iraqi political forces;
- Shifting the link with the Islamic Resistance Forces network in the region underscores the principle of voluntariness [Jamshidi & Davand, 2019: 61-62].
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The Mobilization Forces (PMF) Challenges

It should also be noted that PMF is confronted with a series of obstacles to the continuation of his actions. On the one hand, ISIS’s tactics have somewhat led to a slowdown in the movement of brutal forces and an increase in the number of human casualties. ISIS, through the use of explosive traps, bombing of buildings, roadside bombing, mines, blasting bridges and drill bombs, creating embankments and ... has slowed the progress of PMF. On the other hand, international forces, including Sunni Iraqi Arabs, are not willing to recognize the Shahab Shaab forces. Iraqi Sunni politicians strongly opposed PMF’s participation in the Mosul liberation operation. International Coalition Forces the Under the leadership of the United States in the Tikrit liberation operation accepted air strikes on ISIS condition without the PMF.

However, there are certain challenges and obstacles in the future, including the following:

- The opposition and the worry of some Sunni political groups such as the Kurds and Sunnis from Shiite;
- The opposition of the United States and the Arab states to the rise of Sha'abi;
- Structural conflicts with the Iraqi military and security forces;
- Structural and Inner problems problems;
- Weapons and financial problems;
- Sharpening of forces in the level of military efficiency;
- The ambiguity of the legal and legal situation in Iraq (Mir Yousefi & Gharibi, 2016: 153-154).
CONCLUSION

In fact, the implementation of the "basic people security model" in Iraq suggests the formation of a "voluntary, capable and nascent defensive power" that can be extended to the other side. The Iraqi popular forces from hundreds of thousands of young Iraqis operating in more than 40 groups have, in fact, found religious and religious identity with the Ayatollah Sistani fatwas and have been able to create security in Iraq within the framework of "native-centered security". Hence, the role of these forces in security cannot be denied. On the other hand, they have been moving in this direction in order to win public opinion, and to make it clear to Iraqi politicians and policymakers that reliance on the occupiers will not lead to security and thus make military affiliation unnecessary. Therefore, in the face of the threat of ISIS invading Iraq and seizing parts of its geography, the foresight and credibility of the Najaf authority turned into an unparalleled opportunity in the Iraqi military security architecture to bring security to the people. As a result, in order to contain the threatening status of ISIS and the Salafi-Takfiri terrorist currents, the road map for the Iraqi authority was set up to "build the security of the people of the people", followed by a propagandist, the "Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF)", to deal with the unfortunate situation that, if by the side Just look at this issue, not only filling the security structure built-up by the United States, but also being able to transform itself into a powerful and powerful force to play in other areas by modeling the mobilization of the Islamic Republic of Iran; It also has the belief in relying on popular forces in the minds of Iraqi governors.

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