Understanding China-Africa Cooperation: Development Partnership or Neo-Colonialism

Ehizuelen Michael Mitchell Omoruyi1*, CHEN Biao2, ZHANG Jiaming3, LIU Yuankang3, MAI Xiaqin2, GUO Li2, ZHAN Guangyao2, DIAO Weifan3, TIdiane Magassouba3

1Center for Nigerian Studies Institute of African Studies, Zhejiang Normal University, China
2African History, Institute of African Studies, Zhejiang Normal University, China
3International Relations, Institute of African Studies, Zhejiang Normal University, China

*Corresponding Author: Ehizuelen Michael Mitchell Omoruyi, Center for Nigerian Studies Institute of African Studies, Zhejiang Normal University, China, Email: mmacroe@yahoo.com

ABSTRACT
In the recent two decades, China’s economic involvement in Africa was accused of colonialist actions by many Western observers. Nonetheless, most of these accusations have no basis. China tends to build a “development partnership” with African countries with the aim of treating African countries as a strategic partner. In this article, after comprehensively exploring China’s engagement with Africa based on data and case studies, it argues that China’s engagement in Africa in recent decades has nothing to do with neocolonialism. On the contrary, China’s engagement not simply facilitates Africa’s independence from the West and also promotes a fledgling new world order in Africa based on win-win and equal sovereignty. Due to the emergence of new order, the South-South cooperation is increasingly expectable.

Keywords: Africa, China, Development Neo-colonialism, Partnership

INTRODUCTION
In recent years many Western observers frequently criticize that China is a colonial state in Africa where it seizes resources, abuses local workers, attacks African countries national industries and damages ecological environments, and so forth. Nonetheless, the Chinese government totally denies this charge, as Wen Jiabao who was the former Chinese Premier said: “the cap of neo-colonialism can never be worn on Chinese heads absolutely.”

Generally speaking, China’s engagement with Africa in the 21st century is mostly based on pragmatic concerns such as political and economic cooperation while at the same time diluting the ideological tinge that characterized the relationship during the second half of the 20th century. In its first African policy statement ‘China’s Africa Policy the Chinese government declares, ‘China–Africa friendship is embedded in the long history of the interchange. Sharing similar historical experiences, China and Africa have all along sympathized with and supported each other in the struggle for national liberation and forged a profound friendship’. This statement traced Sino-African relations back to historical cooperation and a shared national liberation agenda. According to the White Paper, “Sincerity, equality and mutual benefit, solidarity and common development—these are the principles guiding China-Africa exchanges and cooperation and the driving force to lasting China-Africa relations. The Chinese government believed that both China and Africa were victims of Western colonial exploitation. China engaged with Africa to form an alliance to fight imperialism (Alden, 2007; Shelton, 2001) is applauded by African leaders. As such, many African leaders consider closer economic and political affiliation with China a guarantee for future prosperity, because of China’s accomplishments in the past three decades (Large, 2008).

Many African leaders recognize China not only as an economic partner, but also a country who could provide an alternative development model and a countervailing force both to Western conditionality’s and to the continent’s reliance on Western sources for foreign investment and development assistance (Alden, 2007).
leaders even spoke openly about China’s offer of an alternative to the edicts of Western-dominated institutions like the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. The year 2006 was of great significance to Sino-Africa relations. First, three top Chinese leaders, the Foreign Minister, the President and the Premier toured the African continent within six months as part of a series of high-level exchanges. Also, in the same year, the Chinese government published China’s Africa Policy White Paper, the official policy statement on China’s role in Africa in the new century. The development of bilateral relations culminated in November, when China convened an unprecedented ‘Forum on China–Africa Cooperation’ (FOCAC) summit in Beijing. Leaders from 48 African countries participated in the summit. This event offered us a window to examine how Africa was presented in China’s state media. To understand patterns of China-African economic relations, we argue one must first navigate this evolving political environment and what Brautigam refers to as the “waves of misinformation” regarding China-African relations (Brautigam, 2009). While the continent remains underdeveloped, African countries have access to, and control of, an abundance of natural resources that are critical for China’s continued economic growth.

 Whereas China-African relations historically have fluctuated between engagement and indifference (Large, 2008; Van Ness, 1998), China’s rise as a superpower suggests perhaps the beginning of a more enduring economic relationship. Chinese efforts to secure natural resources through greater relations with Africa are well documented, with the efforts often labeled as neocolonialism (Zweig and Bi, 2005; Frynas and Paulo, 2006; Taylor, 2006a; Melber, 2007; Herman, 2007; Norberg, 2006). Even South African President Thabo Mbeki cautioned about growing China-African relations resembling neocolonialism (Mahtani, 2007; Russell, 2007). Others attempt to uncover broader motivations behind Chinese aid and investment throughout the continent (Brautigam, 1998; Pehnelt, 2007; McLaughlin, 2005; Timberg, 2006; Brautigam, 2009). Instead of focusing solely on what China receives from African nations, we suggest one should view China-African relations as mutually constructed and dynamic relations. Any attempt to understand current China-African trends thus require a study from several simultaneous perspectives, rather than the general tendency of the literature to focus on China and Africa (or African countries) as unitary actors (Muekalia, 2004; Tull, 2006). Few empirical analyses from Africans on the subject have been forthcoming, further hampering a balanced understanding of these relations (Amphai and Naidu, 2008; Kweisi, 2007). In addition, what constitutes aid remains poorly defined. Our approach thus attempts to contextualize contemporary China-African relations, give adequate weight to both Chinese and diverse African interests, and provide clarity to some of the jargon within the relevant literature. This paper will first briefly introduce the history of China-African relations during the Cold War and how it shapes present relations. An unpacking of the economic assistance to African countries follows, suggesting how African relations with the West have shaped current views of the “Beijing Consensus”. In conclusion, we attempt to shed light on the impact of growing China-African relations and discourage framing such relations in extreme terms.

**Historical Relations**

China’s first contact with Africa dates to the Ming Dynasty (Filesi, 1972) but only after the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949 did consistent substantive relations across the continent become commonplace. Improving China-African relations served multiple goals. First, securing African support was crucial in China’s diplomatic battles with Taiwan (Republic of China), not only to prevent support for a “two China” policy, but to ultimately gain entry into the United Nations. Recognition was thus viewed as a reflection of sovereignty, the “golden ring that political leaders hope to grasp” (Krasner, 2009). This Cold War diplomatic battle coincided with the end of nearly a century of colonial rule throughout Africa, leaving extensive social and political upheaval post-independence. With African nations comprising a third of UN membership by the mid-1960s, Africa became fertile ground for China’s recognition goals.

Outmaneuvering Taiwan for recognition among these newly independent states became crucial to ultimately attaining UN representation. In 1959, Mao Zedong referred to Africa as a partner in the “struggle against imperialism”, implicitly tying recognition to grander ideological battles (Mao, 1998). Still, from 1960–1963, 13 of the 23 African countries recognized Taiwan, compared to five for the PRC.3 In 1963–1965 Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai

---

3 Despite the competition Central African Republic,
visited eleven African countries attempting to frame China’s position in the region as an ally in anti-colonialism, while committing the PRC to nearly $120 million in aid (Brauitgam, 2009). Despite the poor reception for Zhou at the time, by mid-decade support on the continent was nearly evenly divided between China and Taiwan, highlighting Africa’s role within this Cold War conflict. By the end of the 1970s and after gaining a seat on the UN Security Council, the tides had turned with forty-four African countries recognizing China compared to five for Taiwan (Taylor, 2002). Cold War rationales for recognition in most cases did not equate to deeper relations, nor did this fundamentally change in the immediate post-Cold War era. Where diplomatic relations globally are rarely revoked once established, African countries continually play a bargaining game between China and Taiwan. Nine countries – Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, the Gambia, Lesotho, Liberia, Niger, Senegal and the Central African Republic – have switched relations more than once, with the latter switching five times since 1962.

Secondly, expanding relations in Africa tied into growing Sino-Soviet conflict. While Beijing made appeals from at least the Bandung Conference of 1958 to position itself as the benefactor of the Third World, China also used its newfound influence in Africa to support revolutionary and national liberation movements in present-day Namibia, Zimbabwe, Algeria, Cape Verde, and elsewhere. Specifically, Beijing attempted to associate African independence with communist revolution as a means to ensure Chinese interests on the continent (Yu, 1988). Furthermore, to African leaders China appeared as a less threatening version of communism, aiding Chinese interests. Even during the Cultural Revolution when China’s focus largely turned inward, China used Africa as a proxy for souring relations with the Soviet Union. This often led to Chinese support for movements opposing Moscow-backed organizations, most notably in Mozambique and Angola (Yu, 1988:851; Snow, 1998:78, 121-134). Similarly, relations with Tanzania allowed China to respond to an increasing Soviet naval presence nearby (Copper, 1976:15) Other than ideological support however, Chinese assistance remained rather minimal. China’s foreign aid remained concentrated in Southeast Asia primarily in assisting the North Vietnamese. From 1970-1977, China committed $1.9 billion to 29 African nations (US Central Intelligence Agency, 1978), yet with the exception of the TanZam Railway connecting Tanzania and Zambia (one of the largest infrastructure projects to that date on the continent), Chinese public projects failed to match the size and scope of American and Soviet efforts. Similarly, Sino-African commercial exchanges remained minimal throughout much of the Cold War, reaching only $817 million in 1977 (Servant, 2005). The point here is that China may have missed the boat early on in establishing deeper substantive relations with African nations and leaders and have in recent years have attempted to catch up, a diplomatic Great Leap Forward.

For over 40 years Sino-African relations could be explained through an ideological lens. Once the Cold War ended, China largely retreated from these ideological frontlines. However, it was also during this time that China began its ascent as a global economic and political powerhouse. Promoting rapid economic development, which the PRC has in part based their legitimacy on in the post-Cold War environment, would require greater access to international markets and natural resources. Concurrently, many African governments found themselves struggling to develop due to a lack of external investment and interest even though many of these newly independent countries had an abundance of natural resources.

As African states attempted to improve economic conditions, relations with China became more important as an export destination. Although the focus has been natural resources such as oil, the sheer size of the Chinese domestic market should make any developing country interested in increasing exports to China. Besides boosting export levels, increased Sino-African relations increased public revenues (Reisen, 2007). As a country becomes accustomed, perhaps even dependent, on the potential gains from exports to China, breaking relations with the PRC thus becomes more politically and economically costly. This is similar to how many African governments became dependent on their ties with international financial institutions (IFIs) beginning in the 1970s with the oil crisis and subsequent period of the 1980s when the cycle of poverty took off due to massive loans and repayment agreements. Over time the terms of agreement for loans increasingly came to favor the western lenders at the expense of the

Cote D’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Niger, and Sierra Leone, all UN members, recognized neither government at first (Klein, 1963:45-50).
developing nations of Africa. Relations with China thus potentially become self-reinforcing due to African development needs.

In the short run, China provides economic opportunity while ignoring the systemic problems that plague African nations, specifically human rights violations and other social and political abuses that have come to define African institutions and post-Cold War development. The nexus of China’s demand for natural resources and African demand for investment and export markets has thus created a mutually beneficial situation where economic interests appear to trump political concerns. Meanwhile growing Sino-African relations attempt to construct a common identity in contrast to the West, perhaps in part rebranding Cold War frameworks. Whether this dynamic relationship can blossom beyond its economic roots however remains uncertain.

HOW CHINA-AFRICAN COOPERATION MAGNETIZE A SUBSTANTIAL AUDIENCE?

Certain Western media have set off a wave discrediting Sino-African relations, measuring the Beijing Consensus in the scale of the Western-African version, and hyping the fact that China engages in neo-colonialism in Africa. This clearly indicates that the mutually beneficial Sino-African cooperation has affected the Western world’s vested interests, causing dissatisfaction, and this clearly indicates that the hegemonies will continue to pay close attention to China’s strategic policy towards Africa. Identically, studies have observed that to precede the long-held dream of milking the continent’s natural resources without rivals and to achieve their own political goals, the hegemonies ‘media judge China’s action as lacking merit (Lumumba-Kasongo 2011). This is in accordance with other studies which claim that the development of political and economic relations between China and Africa, which have become increasingly stable with peaceful coexistence, has once again evoked the historical guilt of the former colonial masters (Alden 2005; Haroz 2011).

Moreover, findings of studies on Sino-African relationship have led to heated debates, for instance, Hirono and Suzuki argue that ‘China’s rise to power presents a unique and almost unprecedented challenge to the maintenance of the Western-dominated world order’ (Hirono and Suzuki 2014, 445). Similarly, Zhao mentions that ‘A cross-section of Africans has a favourable opinion of China because, while the Western investments and assistants failed to lift African countries out of poverty, China’s way of doing business provides an alternative opportunity for Africans’ (Zhao 2014, 1034). Likewise, Haroz precisely reasons, ‘This is largely because China lacks a colonial legacy in the region’ (Haroz 2011, 65–66).

Furthermore, while addressing the conference at the commemoration of the sixtieth anniversary of the Chinese People’s Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries(CPAFFC) on 15 May 2014, the Chinese President Xi Jinping outlined that, ‘There is no gene for invasion in Chinese people’s blood, and Chinese people will not follow the logic that “might is right”’ (China Daily 2014). Similarly, in China Daily Magazine Li Yang also wrote,

As the sleeping dragon awoke toward the end of the last century, the West felt uneasy. And when it took off on the road to rapid economic development, the West’s unease began turning into fear, giving rise to the “China threat” theory which is bandied about sorampantly across the world today (Yang 2010).

Identically, Campbell-Mohn, an analyst at the Global Markets Institute articulates that,

While Americans recognize China’s rapid rise as an economic powerhouse, the implications remain murky. According to a 2014 Gallup poll, most people unfavorably view China as the world’s leading economic power. Indeed, twenty percent of Americans viewed China, not Iran, as America’s top enemy in 2014. When discussing China, Americans think of its 13.39trillion GDP (2013 est.), expansion into the South China Sea or human right abuses (Campbell-Mohn 2015).

Many other scholars have argued in a similar manner (Adem 2010; Alden 2005; Asongu and Aminkeng 2013; Haroz 2011; Lumumba-Kasongo 2011; Yi-Chong 2014).

Several studies have debated whether China gives additional conditional aid to Africa as a form of prerequisite protection of Sino-African relations and for particular political demands or whether China is taking advantage of Africa to

---

Understanding China-Africa Cooperation: Development Partnership or Neo-Colonialism

secure access to resources. In fact, China’s aid to Africa covers a broad array of fields including health, infrastructure, agriculture, technical, political, and scholarship. As several studies argue, China’s aid to Africa is unconditional. For instance, studies have remarked that China’s aid to Africa is not as the Western hegemony criticized but ‘is given unconditionally, it is infrastructure-focused and it is tied’ (X. Wang, Ozanne, and Hao 2014, 52). Likewise, Feng and Mu observe that, ‘Unlike France and the United States, China attaches no specific political demands when supplying aids and communicating with Africans, and China allows African countries to retain complete sovereignty’ (Feng and Mu 2010, 7252).

Equally, Lafargue explicitly states that ‘Chinas arrival in Africa provides African nations with a new horizon. Unlike France and the United States, China makes no specific political demands, and allows African countries to retain complete sovereignty’ (Lafargue 2005, 3). In a similar manner, Caniglia remarks that the contemplation of both Africa and China demonstrate a positive attitude to the mutual economic gains and partnership, and China feels that every African country has the right to be a sovereign state and be responsible for their own development path. African countries reckon that they can benefit from the new business opportunity (Canigilia 2011). For this and other major reasons, Babaci-Wilhite, Geo-JaJa, and Shizhou (2013) conclude that China’s aid to the continent is totally distinct and different from that of the Western.

It is important to realize that if Westerns had been interested in assisting the continent to escape out of its poverty circle and transform into being wealthy, a decade would have been enough. However, they have been in Africa for centuries yet nothing has changed. When China stepped into the continent for a couple of decades, changes were perceived almost everywhere. With this in mind, China particularly in assisting with infrastructure, technology transfer, manufacturing and agricultural production, debt relief, emergency humanitarian aid, and sizeable educational cooperation, and medical and technical assistance has won the hearts and minds of the African nations and their leaders (Bradman 2007; He 2013; OECD 2006; Samy 2010).

Several hegemonies’ literature and media deem that China is practicing the neo-colonialism strategy in Africa. Therefore, in order to effectively refute the fallacy of the neo-colonist perspective about Sino-African cooperation, it is indeed necessary to clarify, from the bottom, the qualitative difference between neo-colonialism and Sino-African cooperation.

Critiques and Clarification of Neo-Colonialism

The term neo-colonialism began to prevail in discussions of academia and politicians since the Pan-African movement, and a lot of research and discussion have been conducted in the academic circles both in Africa and abroad (Asongu and Aminkeng 2013; Hodges 1972; Lumumba-Kasongo 2011; Nkrumah 1965; Sartre, Robert, and Young 2006; Vengroff 1975). Correspondingly, since the late 1950s and early 1960s meetings of the All-African Peoples’ Conference (AAPC), attended by representatives of the governing parties, delegates from the independent African countries as well as delegates from independence movements, the critique of independence and neo-colonialism began to spread largely (Reynolds 2015). Generally, the upsurge of the neo-colonialism research in the academic circles is divided into three stages: from the mid-1960s to the early 1980s, from the end of World War II (WWII) to the 1970s, and from the late 1980s to early 1990s. The first stage is associated with the development and changes of neo-colonialism itself. At the second stage, neo-colonialism was very popular, and at the third stage, great changes were taking place in the worldwide situation but neo-colonialism was simultaneously gaining momentum and rose with new concerns in academia and still constitutes an African problem.

Neo-colonialism may simply refer to the involvement of powerful and economically rich and dominant countries in the matter of public interest of less powerful and poor economic countries (Nkrumah 1965). Additionally, most analysts and politicians argue that neo-colonialism is a capitalist power, precisely the developed countries’ capitalist power, exercised by various means without direct colonial rule, which is differentiated from the naked gunboat policy of the old colonial system. However, in certain cases, it presents in the explicit armed invasion manner to control and loot the minerals and resources from the less developed countries.

Till date, academic circles have not provided a consistent definition of neo-colonialism because the manifestations have changed in different periods and have sometimes even been mixed and intensified in different aspects, mainly in
social, economic, political, military, ideological, and cultural aspects. Nevertheless, the main objective of the practice of neo-colonialism is to continue intervening, controlling, exploiting, and plundering a region without the presence of rivals. Emphatically, the danger of neo-colonialism is that the developed countries plunder the economy by monopolizing the commodity price while the developing countries face detrimental results.

Incidentally, in the last three decades or so, China has been the fastest growing economy and has secured the second rank in the world’s economy scale (Lumumba-Kasongo 2011; Overholt 2016). The world has witnessed the egression of China as a global power, the emerging nexus of ‘intra-Asian’ trading, as the largest aid donor, and as the largest trader and constituting the higher inflow of direct investment in Africa (Davies et al. 2008; Morck and Yeung 2016). Evidently, while the country has an accelerating economy, the demand for raw materials, oil, gas, minerals, and other resources are also increasing at the same extent. Obviously, to nourish and satisfy the demand for energy and raw materials, neo-colonialism activities might be engaged in. However, China is not the only country in Africa which is involved in procuring energy resources and raw materials but there are other emerging powers. It also cannot be denied that developed countries have the urgency and thirst to secure natural resources and raw materials in Africa.

Scholars observe the difference between the former colonials and China on the basis that resource engagement in Africa is their method of diplomacy. Diplomacy leaves the state to retain complete sovereignty, so does China (Alden 2005; Feng and Mu 2010; Lafargue 2005), and diplomacy lacks a colonial legacy, so does China (Haroz 2011; Hirono and Suzuki 2014). Indeed, China’s method of diplomacy is different from the former colonials and other emerging powers. Thus, the question is – why is China considered a threat? What is the basis of the accusations against China?

Chinese academia and several authors believe that all these growing debates and criticism about the Sino-African relations are just speculation or Sino-phobia (Adem 2010; Asongu and Aminkeng 2013; Lumumba-Kasongo 2011; Mlambó, Kushamba, and Simawu 2016), and that ‘this does not make China a uniquely pernicious presence’ in Africa (Hirono and Suzuki 2014, 445). The French emperor Napoleon Bonaparte, about 200 years ago, had the foresight to claim, ‘Let China Sleep, for when the Dragon awakes, she will shake the world’ (Stonefish 2016).

Several studies have also unmasked a profound analysis of the comparison between the developed countries’ and China’s actions towards African countries stating that, ‘China has no history of enslavement, colonization, financing coups against unfriendly African regimes or deploying military forces in support of its foreign policies’ (Zhao 2014, 1036). Additionally, while companies from the developed countries ‘have come under increasing pressure and oversight from shareholders and regulators to tell their African partners to abide by certain political and ethical conditions, the Chinese have followed a policy of “non-interference” in domestic affairs’ (Zhao 2014, 1036). Similarly, Kolstad and Wiig also point out, ‘The official position of the Chinese government is that its policy toward Africa is based on a more reciprocal model, highlighting mutual benefits and win-win situations, than the traditionally exploitative Western pattern of transactions with Africa’ (Kolstad and Wiig 2011, 32).

To summarize, now that the Dragon has awakened, the hegemonies are fearfully trying to shield themselves from its fire. To protect themselves from the same, hegemonies have labelled China’s presence in Africa as a neo-colonialist approach. However, what the former colonial masters fail to realize is that the neo-colonialist approach does not come only from the intentions of foreign countries but also from certain undemocratic country leaders in the African continent such that they may exert dictatorial powers over their own citizens for the sake of both personal and former colonial masters’ interests (Balasubramaniam 2015; Nkrumah 1965). In fact, a few African leaders’ perception about the neo-colonialism condition is too vague and even aligns with the old colonialists’ ideology (Zinkin 1993, 347). O’Connor also supports this argument and observes that,

In the pure case of neo-colonialism, the allocation of economic resources, investment effort, legal and ideological structures, and other features of the old society remain unchanged – with the single exception of the substitution of ‘internal colonialism’ for formal colonialism, that is, by the transfer of power to the domestic ruling classes by their former
Surprisingly, the strengthening economic relationship between China and Africa can last for a long time and continue to reflect its strong vitality, but it is realistic and significant fact that China’s approach does not have the neo-colonialist agenda behind it.

**THE CHINESE ALTERNATIVE**

Economics clearly motivates growing Sino-African relations. In assessing these relations, disentangling traditional aid packages from other forms of investment and assistance is crucial. This, however, is complicated by the lack of Chinese transparency. As a result, outside observers commonly lump loans, investment and aid into one category, which may project an inaccurate image of Chinese influence when much of the resources from China meet neither the Chinese nor the traditional Western standards of aid. As Brautigam (2009) points out, the amount of Chinese aid reported is often wildly inaccurate, including the confusion of Chinese renminbi (RMB) for US dollars (Nasrawi, 2006; Zhang, 2006a). Much of the reported aid is in actuality loans specifically tied to buy Chinese equipment and/or consumer goods. Such packages led to $50 billion of Chinese exports entering Africa in 2008 alone.

Within twenty-five years, China moved from the eighth largest bilateral donor to Africa to play a more prominent role on the continent by 2007 as the second largest investor, second only to the US. With the 2006 Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), China hosted 40 African heads of state, pledging to double economic packages by the end of the decade (Taylor, 2009:18). More importantly, China offers African leaders an alternative model of development based on trade instead of foreign aid and subsidized loans (Moyo, 2009). One would be hard-pressed to identify long term economic success from the decades of Western aid to Africa. For example, from 1970 to 1998, the peak era for aid to Africa, poverty rose from 11 to 66 percent. Meanwhile, Africa’s share of world trade and global Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) has declined from the latter part of the 20th century to the present (Sautman and Hairong, 2007). Furthermore, western approaches to African development and assistance have been criticized as myopically focusing on market liberalization without a safety net (Zhang, 2006a). While one can debate African leaders’ commitment to development (Taylor, 2006b), the “Beijing Consensus” suggests, perhaps naively, that the type of assistance and how it is distributed is key. Unlike the Western model of providing assistance and handing over projects to domestic officials and agencies, a policy which several scholars argue has failed abysmally (Easterly, 2006:189-190). China maintains a continued stake in joint projects. All of this seems to be doing what once was thought to be impossible: discouraging increasing levels of debt among African countries (Reisen, 2007).

While traditionally Western assistance seldom covers infrastructure, Chinese packages often target this very need, seeing it as a crucial prerequisite for mutually beneficial economic development. China’s financing commitments across the continent are diverse—approximately 28 percent in the energy sector, 19 percent in telecommunication, and 13 percent in transport by 2007 (Reisen, 2007). For example, from 2002 to 2006, China granted $5 billion in credit and aid to Angola, making it China’s largest foreign aid destination (China Economic Review, 2007). Of this, more than $2 billion was dedicated solely for infrastructural projects, including roads, railroads, and fiber optic networks. Such investments have led Reisen (2007:8) to argue that “there rarely has been such rapid and intense investment in African infrastructure as is going on today.” Chinese assistance for infrastructure is not without strings, as many tie loans and grants to Chinese mining rights, however, this still does not negate that such projects are crucial in providing an environment for African development. FDI follows a similar pattern. Whereas 3/4th of US FDI in Africa targets access to oil, nearly two-thirds (64 percent) of Chinese FDI in Africa went towards manufacturing ventures (Ferguson, 2004). These differences in priorities further contribute to African views of a Chinese modeling contrast to Western models locking Africa into underdevelopment and unequal exchange (Srkar, 2001). This may partially explain why western assistance is increasingly focused on infrastructural needs, from water projects and transportation networks to information technology connectivity.

In addition to “hard investments” in infrastructure and ICT networks, China has provided educational loans and opportunities to young Africans by attracting students to Chinese universities (Cheng, 2012). Such efforts are consistent with a broader Chinese “charm offensive” of humanitarian assistance (often in terms of providing doctors) and other programs.
to counteract domestic anti-China sentiment due to alterations in traditional economic practices. Any long-term relationship between China and Africa will rely heavily upon an educated class of workers and entrepreneurs who understand new technologies and business practices; hence even this type of “investment” is key to China’s interests throughout the Continent. Cheap consumer goods such as cell phones and computers are important for African development as many struggles to afford such necessities. In Rwanda cell phones from China are offered for a lower cost than similar phones from the United States or Japan, giving even the rural poor access to technologies once thought to be beyond the reach of the most vulnerable populations.

In contrast to the West, China has married its long held policy of non-intervention with its economic interactions in Africa. From its Cold War origins, China’s non-interventionist policy had domestic concerns in mind, preventing any precedent which would justify intervention in what China views as domestic issues: Tibet, Xinjiang, and Taiwan. China’s modern strain of non-intervention has been an attractive approach considering that African nations have been increasingly reluctant to accept aid from western donors and institutions due to the stipulations that are often attached to such assistance. For example, China remained largely silent on Sudanese actions in Darfur and the south, deferring to the African Union, while Chinese trade with the country jumped from $103 million in 1990 to $5.66 billion by 2006 (Jiang, 2009:598). Even though the Chinese alternative appears to provide positive incentives in terms of development, China must also contend with the often perverse incentives due to previous and current development packages and African reliance on natural resources. De Soysa (2000:121) has argued that resources contribute to a “rentier state” where the production and sale of such resources fuel the corruption that is already present due to underdeveloped political institutions. This, in turn, makes both the state and society susceptible to external influences that may exploit these vulnerabilities for their own benefit at the expense of long-term, post-conflict development in the host countries. The result is the long term entrenchment of corruption centered around the exploitation of natural resources to serve political ambitions, which may contribute to prolonged conflict.

It should be noted that the Chinese have not always adhered to a policy of non-intervention in Africa. As early as 1963, China began providing military equipment and training to the FNLA and UNITA liberation movements in Angola as a show of solidarity with anti-colonial and anti-imperialist movements in southern Africa (Campos and Vines, 2008:2). By 1974, at the dawn of Angolan independence, the Chinese were financing UNITA while the Soviet Union backed the MPLA (Campos and Vines, 2008:2). In Mozambique, a country that achieved independence under similar circumstances and in the same year as Angola, the socialist FRELIMO government accepted aid from both the Chinese and the Soviets during their civil war against RENAMO (Roque, 2009:2). Unlike Angola, however, Mozambique has a long history of western investment and engagement which led to market reforms in the late 1980s and an end to the civil war with South African backed RENAMO by 1992.

The cases of Angola and Mozambique support claims that Chinese engagement with Africa has evolved from a relationship centered on Cold War politics and ideology to one based on mutual benefits within the context of rapid globalization and market competition. Today, Angola receives the largest amount of Chinese investment due to its comparative advantage of oil wealth, a highly sought after commodity for China’s expanding economy and emerging middle class. In addition to Chinese investments in infrastructure, public facilities, and manufacturing, the Chinese have been one of the largest donors for post-conflict reconstruction in a number of countries, yet another shift in the focus of Chinese post-Cold War aid that coincides with immediate needs for many African countries.

More recently, Sierra Leone’s civil war was financed by the production and sale of “blood diamonds” to western markets and offers a direct link between resources that were in high demand and conflict (Collier, 2000:91). Conflict in the DRC has also been facilitated by the presence of mineral resources such as diamonds and coltan, essential in producing cell phone and computer batteries. Even when resources were not the cause of civil conflict, their abundance helped fund its continuation, as evident in Sudan where oil revenues reinforce ethnic and religious tensions. More broadly countries as diverse as Nigeria (oil), the Ivory Coast (cocoa), and Tanzania (a burgeoning fishing industry centered around Lake Victoria) have faced similar resource-related problems.

In addition to the resource curse, there are
concerns related to the use and distribution of land throughout the countryside in many African nations (Cotula et al., 2009). Increasingly, African governments are adopting ambitious land reform policies which allow for the expropriation of land at which point the land can be sold by the state to private foreign investors. China is said to be one of the major sources of this investment because the Chinese government anticipates that its growing population will need additional resources for agricultural production in the near future. Based on this presumption, the Chinese government offers subsidies and incentives for private investors who are buying farmland in Africa, making this type of investment an attractive source of revenue for African governments while simultaneously depriving their own constituents access to land and consequently their main source of subsistence. In sum, evaluating Sino-African relations requires not only viewing state to state relations, but domestic pressures as well.

There are a number of ways in which to understand Chinese investment in African agriculture. First, there is a direct investment in infrastructure, including modern irrigation systems and the building of roads and railways to transport crops from fields to markets. Second, there are ‘land grabs’ wherein private Chinese investors will buy land to then be used for large scale farming. Sometimes this land is taken from the rural farmers by their government or land laws are rewritten in a way that makes the selling of private land to foreign investors ‘easier.’ Third, in recent years’ countries such as Senegal and Angola in have adopted free-market reforms that encourage foreign investment. This type of agricultural investment allows for Chinese firms to ‘set up shop’ in an African country, import Chinese employees, and manage their business with little political interference in return for paying taxes to the state for the privilege of operating in the country. This is where the current relationship between China and Africa, especially oil rich nations such as Sudan, becomes controversial. China has expressed a ‘don’t ask, don’t tell’ policy which states that as long as China has access to resources, they will not criticize or involve themselves in the domestic affairs of African states. Finally, the Chinese are investing in theirown future by investing in African agriculture. As the Chinese population grows, and the middle class demands more meat and dairy, food security will become a problem in the foreseeable future. Therefore, Chinese investment in African agriculture is a way to establish relations before a food crisis occurs.

Another area of similarity between Chinese and African rural development may be found in policies of collectivization and resettlement. Tanzania experimented with forced resettlement in the 1960s and 1970s in the name of Ujamaa, or ‘family hood,’ that was designed to usher in a socialist state through rural reform. A key component for modern Rwanda’s development strategy is the policy of imidugudu, of ‘villagization’, which is essentially the same type of forced resettlement experienced in Tanzania but predicated on arguments that it supports large reforms such as commercialization and increased food security. Ethiopia is currently preparing to construct Africa’s largest hydro-electric dam, the Gibe III Dam. Since early 2010 the government has already forcefully resettled 60,000 rural Ethiopians to make way for the project (Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 2009). The point here is that all of these governments have at some point in time received financial assistance from the Chinese and the projects have also resembled similar projects carried out during China’s green revolution in the 1960s. This suggests that Chinese influence has penetrated the policy process itself throughout Africa. This is not necessarily a negative thing, though. China has a shared interest in ensuring that rural reform is successful in Africa as it may well be the critical component to ensuring long-term food imports for China’s growing population, specifically the middle class.

**CONCLUSION**

The independence movement of African countries and the founding of ‘New China’ in the Mao era led to the emergence of a new Sino-African friendly relationship epoch. Over the past half-century, the two countries have had trade relations, frequent exchange of high-level visits, close political ties, frequent medical personnel provision, fruitful cooperation in different aspects, and consultation in international affairs.

China has provided the best possible financial assistance for African countries, and African countries have provided China strong political support and helped in fulfilling its national economic interest. Sino-African cooperation grows on the grounds of equality and mutual benefit, sincere and friendly cooperation, and common developmental aspects with a non-interventional approach in each other’s internal affairs. Such a sincere cooperation exposes the difference between the Western-African and Sino-African relations. Although certain Western media
have set off a wave attempting to discredit Sino-African relations, the development of Sino-Africa relations might last for a long time and continue to reflect the strong vitality which is worthy to be recorded in world history as an example.

REFERENCE


Understanding China-Africa Cooperation: Development Partnership or Neo-Colonialism


Understanding China-Africa Cooperation: Development Partnership or Neo-Colonialism


